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APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Appellants Alpine Coal Company, Inc. and AGTC, Inc., defendants-counterclaimants
below ("A&A"), appeal from a March 1, 2010 order of summary judgment and dismissal
disposing of all their claims for relief, asserted by counterclaim (the "March 1,2010 Order").
(5531 (Tab A).)1

Claims for relief by appellee CoBon Energy, LLC, plaintiff-

counterdefendant below ("CoBon"), remain pending below. On March 19,2010, A&A filed
a U.R.A.P. 5 petition for permission to appeal the March 1,2010 Order, which was granted
on May 10, 2010. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to U.R.A.P. 5 and
Utah Code SS 78-2-2(3X0 and 78-2a-3(2)(j).
ISSUES ON APPEAL
A&A's claims for relief against CoBon were for recovery of over $22,000,000 of
unpaid fees due under their November 1,1996 "Consulting Agreement" with CoBon for their
services regarding the development and sale of synthetic fuel manufacturing plants ("A&A's
Claims"). At issue is the trial court's ruling that A&A's Claims had been released and were
barred by a June 28, 2000 "Settlement Agreement and Release" (the "June 2000 Release")
between Viron Energy ("Viron") and Robena, LLC ("Robena"). (1131 (Tab B).) The June
2000 Release had settled Viron's Pennsylvania state court action for breach of contract
against Robena, involving a $60,000 fee dispute under their contract, a July 1,1998 retainer

1

Number citations are to pages of the record on appeal, unless indicated as page
citations within a document. Documents also cited as "Tab" are contained in Appellants'
Addendum. Citations to "Ex." are either to exhibits within documents or to exhibits included
in Appellants' five volume appendix of exhibits below regarding the motions for summary
judgment, which was given one record number (6548), e.g., "6548 at Ex. 850."

agreement. The July 1,1998 agreement was an entirely separate contract from CoBon's and
A&A's Consulting Agreement. Robena was the operating company for one of the plants that
had been developed, the Robena plant, and was unaffiliated with CoBon when it retained
Viron to provide services to the already operating Robena plant. "Viron" was a name for
A&A, but was used only in their contracts with Robena. CoBon was not a party to Viron's
and Robena's July 1,1998 contract or their dispute. A&A's Claims under the November 1,
1996 Consulting Agreement, which is the contract at issue in this litigation, did not start
accruing until well after the June 2000 Release was executed.
The issues now on appeal are the following:
1.

Was the trial court's application of the June 2000 Release to claims that did not

exist at the time that release was executed incorrect, as a matter of law, under the settled rule
that a release is to be strictly construed against application to claims that had not accrued
when the release was given? (2059.)
2.

Did the parties to the June 2000 Release, Viron and Robena, intend with the

mutual settlement and release of "any and all claims . . . relating to or arising from any
consulting services which Viron has performed regarding the Robena Synthetic Fuel Plant"
to settle and release only those parties' claims relating to Viron's services to Robena under
their separate contract regarding the operation of the Robena synthetic fuel plant, or did
Viron and Robena also intend to settle and release any and all potential and future claims by
A&A against CoBon that could arise for payment for A&A's separate services to CoBon
under CoBon's and A&A's separate Consulting Agreement regarding the development of

multiple synthetic fuel plants? (2059.)
3.

Even incorrectly assuming, as did the trial court, that the scope of a release can be

determined without analysis of the release's language, was the trial court's finding that the
June 2000 Release had settled a dispute between CoBon and A&A under their Consulting
Agreement a legally sufficient basis for applying the June 2000 Release to A&A's Claims
when (a) the dispute relied upon by the trial court did not concern CoBon's duty to pay A&A
under the Consulting Agreement, and (b) CoBon's evidence did not support a finding that
the June 2000 Release had settled any dispute under the Consulting Agreement? (2059.)
Application of the June 2000 Release is a question of contract interpretation. Ward v.
Intermountain Farmers Assoc. 907 P.2d264,265 (Utah 1995). The trial court's application
is given no deference on appeal and is reviewed for correctness. WebBankv. American Gen.
Annuity Serv. Corp.. 2002 UT 88, f 15, 54 P.3d 1139. The propriety of a trial court's grant
of summary judgment is a question of law, reviewed for correctness, including determining
whether there was a legally sufficient factual basis for applying a release to particular claims.
See Id. a t t 10.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND DISPOSITION
IN THE COURT BELOW
This case arises out of A&A's and CoBon's November 1, 1996 "Consulting

Agreement" (the "Consulting Agreement"). In that contract, A&A agreed to assist CoBon
in the development and sale to investors of synthetic fuel manufacturing plants ("synfuel
plants") that were intended to generate significant tax credits for their investors/owners under

Section 29 of the Internal Revenue Code ("Section 29"). (6548 at Ex. 91 (Tab C).) In
exchange for A&A's services to assist in the development of plants, CoBon agreed to pay
A&A 30 percent of CoBon's proceeds from the plants, if any, anticipated to be received over
the length of the Section 29 tax credit program based upon the generation of Section 29 tax
credits. (Id.) A&A provided extensive services to CoBon for almost two years, six synfuel
plants were timely developed by June 30, 1998 and, as CoBon reported at the time, CoBon
started receiving proceeds for tax credits in August 2001 and commenced paying A&A in
November 2001. (1639 (Tab BB); 1759 (TabAA); 6548 at Ex. 977 (Tab Y).) These events
are addressed more fully below.
In November 2002, CoBon asserted a single claim for relief against A&A, claiming the
Consulting Agreement was null and void based upon an alleged change in the tax laws.
(6548 at Ex. 995 (Tab Z).) A&A counterclaimed for the payments that were due and would
become due under the Consulting Agreement. (5342.)
This first action resulted in cross-appeals. The parties settled those cross-appeals by
agreeing to start over, with CoBon allowed to maintain its position as the plaintiff. (5324.)
As contemplated by that settlement, CoBon filed the complaint initiating the action below
on October 20, 2006. (27.) CoBon abandoned its claim that a change in the tax law had
voided the Consulting Agreement. Instead, CoBon asserted ten claims for relief seeking (a)
a declaration that it owed A&A nothing under the Consulting Agreement due to unspecified
alleged breaches and failures of unspecified alleged conditions, (b) unspecified general
damages for alleged breaches of that contract, and (c) the return of the amounts it paid A&A

under that contract. (Id.)
A&A counterclaimed against CoBon for the payments that already were due and that
would become due under the Consulting Agreement and, alternatively, for unjust enrichment.
(94.) A&A's Claims are more fully described below.
On October 2, 2008, CoBon moved for summary judgment in its favor as to all of
A&A's Claims. (1063.) CoBon claimed that A&A's Claims had been released and were
barred by the June 2000 Release because the release allegedly had settled all potential
disputes between A&A and CoBon under the Consulting Agreement. (Id; 1212.) A&A
opposed CoBon's motion on November 7,2008. (2059.) CoBon filed a reply on December
1, 2008. (2245.) The June 2000 Release is discussed below.
On November 7,2008, A&A moved for summary judgment in their favor as to the issue
of CoBon's liability under the Consulting Agreement and as to all of CoBon's claims for
relief. (1569; 1962.) A&A offered extensive affidavit and documentary evidence showing
the following: (a) A&A had worked almost on a full time basis for two years to assist CoBon
in developing synfiiel plants (Tabs AA, BB; 1810; 6548); (b) six synfiiel plants, as part of
three separate projects that A&A were responsible for making available to CoBon, had been
developed, timely put in operation and sold to investors/owners (Tabs AA, BB); (c) CoBon
had received at least $66,252,180 in distributable proceeds from the six synfiiel plants over
the lifetime of the Section 29 tax credit program (1810); and (d) CoBon reported it had
started receiving proceeds for tax credits in August 2001, and CoBon had commenced paying
A&A in November 2001 (Tab Y at AA004282).

CoBon opposed A&A's summary judgment motion on July 9, 2009. (4432; 4583.)
CoBon did not dispute A&A's extensive work for CoBon or Cobon's receipt of at least
$66,252,180 from synfuel plants, but contended that most of the work and all of the proceeds
did not fall under the Consulting Agreement. (Id.) A&A filed a reply in support of their
motion for summary judgment on July 22, 2009. (4958.)
On December 22, 2008, A&A amended their counterclaim to add ancillary claims
against CoBon's affiliates and insiders tor alter ego andfraudulenttransfer liability based
upon an alleged scheme to siphon from CoBon practically all of its proceeds from the synfuel
planls. (2590 (Tab \l).) On February 24, 2009, the ancillary counterdefeadants moved for
summary judgment as to A&A's ancillary claims, inter alia, based upon the June 2000
Release.2 (3 J 56; 3171; 3176.) The ancillary counterdefendants claimed, on the same
grounds asserted by CoBon. that the June 2000 Release also had released and barred the
ancillary claims, (id) A&A opposed this motion on April 6, 2009 and counterdefendants
replied on May 1, 2009. (3391; 3613.) All of the counterdefendants below are referred to
herein as "CoBon" as to their motions for summary judgment and their contentions regarding
the June 2000 Release. CoBon filed a supplement to its motions for summary judgment on
December 23, 2009, to which A&A responded on January 6,2010. (5501; 5517.)
A&A's motion for summary judgment was heard and denied on July 28,2009. (5037;
5882.) The trial court ruled it was unable to interpret the Consulting Agreement without a
trial and, thus, could not determine as a matter of law whether A&A's extensive work for
2

The ancillary counterdefendants conceded that their motions, which were titled as
motions to dismiss, were for summary judgment. (3122-3121.)

CoBon constituted substantial performance of the Consulting Agreement nor whether alleged
breaches and non-occurrences of alleged conditions prevented A&A from being entitled to
their 30 percent share of CoBon's proceeds from the six synfuel plants. (Id.)
CoBon's motions for summary judgment were heard and granted as to the June 2000
Release claims on January 11, 2010. (5518; Tab A.) The trial court adopted wholesale
CoBon's contention that the June 2000 Release had settled even potential future disputes
between CoBon and A&A under the Consulting Agreement. (Tab A (Findings ff3-8).) This
time the trial court was able to interpret the Consulting Agreement without a trial in a manner
so as to support its dismissal of A&A's claims. (Tab A (Findings ^fl).)
The trial court entered the March 1, 2010 Order upon its January 11, 2010 ruling
verbatim as proposed by CoBon. (Tab A.) A&A were not provided the opportunity to object
to the CoBon's proposed order before its entry. (5747; 6023.) The March 1, 2010 Order
ordered summary judgment in favor of CoBon as to A&A's Claims, and the dismissal of
A&A's ancillary claims, on the ground that the claims had been released and were barred by
the June 2000 Release.3 (Tab A.)
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. The Subject Of A&A's Claims Was CoBon's Duty To Pay A&A Under The
Consulting Agreement, Based Upon CoBon's Receipt Of Distributable
Proceeds From Synfuel Plants, For A&A's Services Regarding The
Development And Sale Of Synfuel Plants
The Consulting Agreement concerned the development and sale of synfuel plants. (Tab

3

By the time of the dismissal, the ancillary claims had been asserted in a separate
action that had been consolidated into the action below. (Tab A (Concl. f 9).)

C at § 1.0.) These synfuel plants were to produce a "synthetic" coal fuel product ("synfuel")
by binding small pieces of coal, including waste coal. (Id.; Tab AA at ^5-13.) A primary
motivation for these synfuel plants was a federal income tax credit. (Id.) Significant and
valuable tax credits (worth approximately $25 per ton of production) were available under
Section 29 (later Section 45K) of the Internal Revenue Code to taxpayers who owned synfuel
plants that qualified for Section 29 tax credit treatment and produced and sold what qualified
as synfuel. (Tab AA at ^|5-13.) CoBon was licensed to develop a limited amount of synfuel
plants using a particular technology that had been qualified by the Internal Revenue Service
("IRS") to produce synfuel for the purposes of Section 29 tax credits. (Id.)
CoBon and A&A were the only parties to the Consulting Agreement. (Tab C.) A&A
were referred to as "A&A" in the Consulting Agreement and by CoBon in connection with
that contract (if not as "Alpine Coal" and "AGTC"). (Id.; 6548 at Exs. 468, 868 (Tab W),
869 (Tab X), 929, 1008; labs \ \ AA at f 103.)
CoBon retained A&A under the Consulting Agreement to assist CoBon in its efforts to
quickly develop and sell synfuel plants to tax-oriented investors who could use the Section
29 tax credits. (Tab C at §§1.0, 1.2, 1.3.) A&A were retained due to their experience and
contacts in the coal industry through which they could timely make synfuel development
projects available to CoBon. (Id. at Recitals.) Synfuel plants had to be placed in operation
by June 30, 1998 in order to qualify under Section 29. (Id. at §1.3.) Plants placed in
operation before that deadline could generate substantial tax credits over the Section 29 tax
credit program, which ultimately expired on December 31, 2007. (Tab AA at ffl[5-13.)

A&A agreed in the Consulting Agreement to assist CoBon in obtaining or arranging for
coal feedstock sources, sites for the synfuel plants and contracts for the sale of synfuel. (Tab
C at §§ 1.0,1.2.) A&A also agreed to assist CoBon in selling plants that were developed to
investors. (Id. at § 1.0.) As consideration, CoBon agreed to pay A&A consulting fees equal
to 30 percent of CoBon's proceeds based upon the generation of Section 29 tax credits by
synfuel plants, which CoBon anticipated receiving over the Section 29 tax credit program as
fees for the sale and licensing of synfuel plants.4 (Id. at §2.0.) A&A were at risk since they
would get paid only if CoBon received proceeds from synfuel plants. (Id. at §2.4.) If no
synfuel plants were timely developed or no plant successfully generated Section 29 tax
credits, such that CoBon did not receive proceeds for tax credits, CoBon had no obligation
to pay A&A any consulting fees. (Id.) After a short initial period when CoBon was to hold
A&A's distribution shares in trust while certification ofplants under Section 29 was pending,
CoBon had to pay A&A only when CoBon actually received proceeds. (Id. at §§2.1, 2.2.)
A&A's Claims were for recovery for services provided to CoBon under the Consulting
Agreement regarding nine separate projects to develop and sell synfuel plants. (Tab E at
§§43-48; Tabs AA, BB; 6548.) Three of those projects, the PBS, Pace and Robena projects,
which A&A were responsible for making available to CoBon, resulted in the timely
development and sale of six synfuel plants. (Tab E atfflJ49-53;Tabs AA, BB.)
A&A's Claims were for recovery of A&A's unpaid 30 percent share under the

4

CoBon also agreed to pay A&A 30 percent of its profits on one-time initial license
fees and 30 percent of its profits from sales of the chemical agent used to produce the
synfuel. (Tab C at §3.0.)

Consulting Agreement of distributable proceeds received by CoBon over the course of the
Section 29 tax credit program from the PBS plant, the four Pace plants, and the Robena plant.
(Tab E.) These plants were all certified under Section 29 and ended up generating over a
billion dollars of Section 29 tax credits for their owners, which resulted in CoBon's receipt
of over $66,000,00 of distributable proceeds. (Tabs AA,BB, Eat 1fl[49-66; 1810.) The PBS
plant provided at least $23,636,898 of distributable proceeds to CoBon over time. (Tab E
at 1fl|50, 58-59, 61, 65; 1810.) The four Pace plants provided at least $36773,242 of
distributable proceeds to CoBon over time. (Tab E atfflJ51,60, 62, 66; 1810.) The Robena
plant provided at least $5,842,039 of distributable proceeds to CoBon, the lowest amount of
proceeds from the three successful projects. (Tab E at 1ft[49, 63, 64; 1810.)
B.

The Subject Of The Dispute Settled By The June 2000 Release Was Robena's
Duty To Pay Viron $60,000 For Four Months Of Services Under A July 1,
1998 Agreement That Was Separate From A&A's And CoBon's Consulting
Agreement

On July 1 J 998, by a retention letter, Robena agreed to retain Viron to perform services
regarding the operation of the Robena synfuel plant. (6548 at Ex. 479 (Tab D); Tab AA at
^fl 14.) This July 1, 1998 agreement was entirely separate from and did not amend the
Consulting Agreement. (Tab D.) CoBon was not even a party to the July 1,1998 agreement,
and Robena was not a party to the Consulting Agreement. (Id; Tab C.)
"Viron" was a name by which A&A were referred at their request in the July 1,1998
agreement, rather than a separate entity from A&A. (Tab AA at^|103.) A&A requested that
they be called "Viron" when they proposed in March 1998 to provide operation services to

the Robena synfuel facility, which was under construction at that time.5 (Id.; 6548 at Ex. 390
(Tab F).) The July 1,1998 agreement was the only contract preceding the June 2000 Release
that was between Viron and Robena and that referred to A&A as "Viron." (Tabs C, D.)
CoBon started referring to A&A as "Viron," but only in connection with A&A's services to
Robena; CoBon continued to refer to A&A as "A&A" or "Alpine Coal" and "AGTC" in
connection with their November 1, 1996 Consulting Agreement. (Tabs W-Z, AA at ^fl03;
6548 at Exs. 435 (Tab K), 929, 1008.)
Robena, when it separately retained Viron, was the operating company for the Robena
synfuel plant and was entirely owned by Providian Financial Services ("Providian"), the
investor/owner of the Robena synfuel plant. (Tab AA at f 114; 6548 at Exs. 386,470.) Prior
to June 26, 1998 (the date Providian acquired Robena), Robena had been an affiliate of
CoBon, but not after that date.6 (Id.) At the time Robena retained Viron and until July 1,
1999, Robena was managed by CoBon on behalf of Providian. (Tab AA at f 114.) CoBon,
through its CoBon Synfuel No.2, LLC, was the general partner and a nominal 0.01 percent
owner of the limited partnership through which Providian owned Robena. (Id.)
Robena initially retained Viron with the July 1, 1998 agreement for assistance in
obtaining a short-term supply of coal feedstock needed to operate the Robena plant after its
5

A&A had referred to themselves as "Viron" once before, in a January 1997 letter
to CoBon, but CoBon did not start referring to them as Viron at that time. (1080.)
6

Prior to June 26, 1998, CoBon had used Robena as the project development
company for the Robena synfuel plant. (Tab AA at ^fl 14; 6548 at Ex. 386; 1229-1228.)
Providian purchased that plant from CoBon by acquiring CoBon's membership in Robena.
(Tab BB at ^31 .qq; 6548 at Exs. 386,470.) Providian acquired Robena using Robena, LLP,
which was 99.99 percent owned by Providian. (Tab AA at ^114; 6548 at Exs. 386, 470.)

start up. (lab D.) This short-term supply was needed until a wash facility was completed
that would enable the synfuel plant to use the long-term coal feedstock that Robena had
obtained, with A&A's assistance, for the plant. (Tab AA at fflf 104-105.) As part of the
development of the Robena plant, A&A had assisted CoBon in securing for Robena rights
to a large reserve of waste coal that was to serve as the plant's long-term feedstock source.
(Id.) Without those rights, CoBon would have been unable to sell the Robena plant or obtain
financing for its construction. (Id) A wash facility was needed because the long-term
feedstock source had to be washed before it could be put to optimal use. (Id) However, one
of the terms of Providian's finance and acquisition of the Robena plant, at Providian's
insistence, was that the design and construction of the wash facility be delayed until after the
plant was certified under Section 29. (Id; 6548 at Ex. 713 (Tab M at p.9).) That
certification would not be forthcoming until at least several months after the synfuel plant
had to start operations under Section 29. (Tab AA at | f 104-105.) As such, in order to be
able to produce synfuel at the Robena plant after its start-up, Robena needed additional shortterm feedstock until the wash facility was completed. (Id.) Robena retained Viron for
assistance in obtaining that short-term coal feedstock. (Tab D.)
Robena issued the July 1, 1998 retainer letter immediately after the Robena synfuel
plant became operational and Robena, under Providian's ownership, became the plant's
operating company. (Tabs D, AA at ^114; 6548 at Ex. 850 (Tab U at p.4).) The July 1,1998
agreement called for Robena to pay Viron a $15,000 monthly fee. (Tab D.)
Viron proceeded to obtain new short-term feedstock for what was by then the

operational Robena synfuel plant. (Tab U at p.5.) In addition, Viron performed numerous
other management services regarding the Robena plant, including dealing with labor
disputes. (Id.; Tab M at pp.3-4.) CoBon represented that Viron's services under the July 1,
1998 agreement had been "refined" to include extensive management assistance and that
Viron successfully had performed those services. (Tab U at p.5.) Robena regularly paid
Viron the $15,000 monthly fee due under the July 1, 1998 agreement. (Id; 1162 (Tab S at
Ex. B); Tabs U at p.5, AA at %l 15.)
In May 1999, Viron were continuing to provide operations services to the Robena plant,
which CoBon, now as the general partner, repeatedly characterized as "critical" and essential
to the plant's successful operation. (5878 at Ex. 686; 6548 at Exs. 712 (Tab L at p.5), 765
(Tab Q); Tab M at pp.3-5.) However, at that time, Providian directed Robena, under
CoBon's management, to obtain Providian's approval before paying its services vendors,
including Viron, due to Robena's poor cash flow situation. (Tab AA at ^[117.) Robena,
under CoBon's management, repeatedly lobbied Providmn for authorization for Robena to
pay Viron, stating they were performing vital services, but these efforts were to no avail.
(6548 at Exs. 696, 703; Tab M.)
On July 1, 1999, CoBon was removed as the manager of Robena and replaced by
Palmer Management Corporation ("Palmer") at Providian's direction. (Tabs M, AA at ^ 123;
6548 at Ex. 736.) This was over the objection of CoBon, who had proposed Viron as its
replacement. (Tabs L at pp.5-7, AA atfflfl18-121.) Palmer was retained by Robena and, as
such, had no authority or responsibilities regarding the Consulting Agreement, but was

responsible for managing the July 1, 1998 agreement between Robena and Viron. (6548 at
Exs. 736, 759; Tab AA at ^(123.) CoBon remained as the general partner of Robena, LLP,
but later complained of its lack of authority over Robena given its continued liability to
Providian for Robena's performance. (6548 at Ex. 844 (Tab T at pp.3-4).)
Robena continued not to pay Viron the $15,000 monthly fee through August 1999.
(Tab AA atfflf124-126; 6548 at Ex. 758 (Tab 0).) Still to no avail, CoBon, as the general
partner, repeatedly directed Palmer to have Robena pay Viron, stating Viron were continuing
"in good faith to provide the services requested in order not to interrupt operation^]." (Tab
0; 6548 at Exs. 731, 738 (Tab N).)
On September 1,1999, Viron terminated their services to Robena because they had not
been paid for four months of services, which was $60,000 of monthly fees. (6548 at Exs.
763, 764 (Tab P); Tab AA at f 127.) Viron proceeded to negotiate with Robena's manager,
Palmer, for payment by Robena of the $60,000, as well as terms for continued services to the
Robena plant. (Tab AA at If 129.)
Viron's negotiations with Robena were unsuccessful and, on November 10,1999, Viron
made a formal demand to Robena for payment of the $60,000 within ten days. (6548 at Ex.
802 (Tab R); Tab AA at ^f 131.) That demand went unsatisfied. In response, on November
24,1999, Viron sued Robena in Pennsylvania state court for breach of contract and payment
of the $60,000. (Tab S atffi[3,7,Prayer; Tab AA at 1J132.) Robena was the only defendant.
Viron, which filed the Pennsylvania complaint pro se, alleged the subject contract was
with Robena. (Tab S at H 3; Tab AA at 1(132.) However, Viron misidentified a May 8,1998

letter between CoBon and A&A (which is discussed below) as their contract with Robena.
{Id.) Robena objected to Viron's complaint on the basis that Viron had not identified a
contract with Robena. (6548 at Ex. 831 A.) Robena's outside counsel had to ask CoBon
what Robena's contractual arrangement with Viron was. (6548 at Ex. 832.) As discussed
below, CoBon correctly responded that it was the July 1,1998 agreement, which was the only
contract between Robena and Viron. (Tab U at p.4.)
No discovery was conducted in the Pennsylvania action and, instead, Viron negotiated
with Robena's manager, Palmer, to settle the action. (Tab AA atffl|135,142.) CoBon's
position, as the general partner, was that Robena should pay Viron. (Tabs T at p.3, U at p.3;
6548 at Ex. 851 (Tab V).)
On June 28,2000, Robena and Viron entered into the June 2000 Release, which settled
the Pennsylvania action. (Tabs B, AA at Tf 142.) Viron had negotiated the June 2000 Release
only with Palmer. (Tab AA at ffi[142-143.)
The June 2000 Release stated at its outset that it was between only Viron and Robena:
"THIS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELEASE is made by and between Viron
Energy ... and Robena, LLC." (Tab B.) The June 2000 Release stated in its Recitals it was
settling only a dispute and the resulting Pennsylvania action between Viron and Robena:
"WHEREAS, certain claims, counterclaims and disputes have arisen between Viron Energy
('Viron') and Robena, LLC ('Robena') (collectively, the 'Parties')... [and] the Parties now
desire to settle the claims, counterclaims and disputes between and among them." (Id.) The
June 2000 Release stated that Viron and Robena released the following claims:

any and all claims... which relate to or arise out of any consulting services which
have been performed by Viron regarding the Robena Synthetic Fuel Plant (the
"Project") including, without limitation, claims asserted in, or that could have
been asserted in, the [Pennsylvania action].
(Tab B at § 1 (emphasis added).) Viron and Robena each settled and released this exact same
scope of claims. (Id.)
Viron and Robena stated in the June 2000 Release that they were releasing each other
and the "Released Parties" from the released claims. (Tab B at § 1.) The "Released Parties"
were identiiied and wete all of the persons and entities who had been involved in the
operation of the Robena plant, including CoBon, Palmer, Providian and A&A's principals.
(Id.) None of those persons and entities, other than Robena and Viron, were signatories to
the June 2000 Release. (Id) While all of the identified "Released Parties" were potential
defendants on claims relating to Viron's services to Robena, not all of the "Released Parties"
were potential defendants on claims under the November 1, 1996 Consulting Agreement,
including Palmer.
In consideration for their release, Viron were paid $60,000 by Robena, which was the
exact amount Viron claimed they were owed by Robena for their services under the separate
July 1, 1998 agreement. (Tabs B, S at f7, Prayer) Robena's consideration was a dismissal
of the Pennsylvania action against it. (Tab B at §2.)
Viron's principals understood and intended that the June 2000 Release settled and
released only claims relating to Viron's services to Robena under the July 1,1998 agreement.
(Tab AA atffl[143-144.)Palmer, representing Robena, did not represent to Viron that any
claims other than those claims were being settled and released. (Id.)

C.

CoBon Paid A&A Advances Under The Consulting Agreement Immediately
Before The June 2000 Release Was Executed, Started Paying A& A After The
June 2000 Release Was Executed, And Did Not Repudiate Its Duty To Pay
Until November 2002

In anticipation of receiving proceeds for tax credits from the PBS and Pace synfiiel
plants, CoBon paid $ 10,000 in advances to each of A&A under the Consulting Agreement
in May 2000, immediately before Viron entered into the June 2000 Release. (Tabs W, X, BB
at |48.) As a result, at the time the June 2000 Release was executed, A&A anticipated that
CoBon would be paying them under the Consulting Agreement once CoBon started receiving
proceeds for tax credits. (Tab AA at 1J144.)
In its first and only accounting to A&A, CoBon reported to A&A that it started
receiving distributable proceeds in August 2001. (Tab Y at AA004282.)
In November and December 2001, subsequent to the execution of the June 2000
Release, CoBon started paying consulting fees to A&A under the Consulting Agreement,
based upon the August 2001 commencement of its receipt of proceeds for tax credits. (Tabs
Y at AA004282, BB at 1J49; 6548 at Ex. 1008) CoBon, at that time, paid A&A a total of
$408,000. (Id.) CoBon did not refer to A&A as "Viron" in connection with its May 2000
advances or its November-December 2001 payments. (Id; Tabs W, X.)
In July 2002, CoBon provided its sole accounting to A&A. (Tab Y.) In that
accounting, CoBon acknowledged it had received proceeds from the Pace and PBS plants
"for distribution" to A&A. (Id. at AA004282.) CoBon acknowledged it had started paying
A&A under the Consulting Agreement. (Id.) This accounting did not mention the June 2000
Release and did not refer to A&A as "Viron." (Tabs Y, AA at f 145.)

In November 2002, following a dispute concerning CoBon's accounting, CoBon first
informed A&A that CoBon was taking the position it had no obligation to pay A&A under
the Consulting Agreement, on the basis of an alleged change in the tax laws. (Tabs Z, AA
at ^fl02.) CoBon did not mention the June 2000 Release and did not refer to A&A as
"Viron" at this lime. (Id.; Tab AA at Tf 144) CoBon had not in any fashion repudiated its duty
to pay the contract price before this time (November, 2002). (Tab AA at Tf 144.)
CoBon did not plead the June 2000 Release in its original complaint below or its answer
to the original counterclaim. (27; 112.) CoBon did not make any claim under the June 2000
Release until its October 2008 motion for summary judgment. (1212.)
D.

The Dispute The Trial Court Relied Upon Did Not Concern CoBon's Duty
To Pay A&A, And The Evidence Showed That The June 2000 Release Had
Not Settled A Dispute Under The Consulting Agreement

The trial court, in the March 1, 2010 Order, did not analyze the language of the June
2000 Release in order to determine the intended scope of the release. Instead, the trial court
determined that the June 2000 Release applied to A&A's Claims and A&A5 s ancillary claims
by finding, based upon extrinsic evidence, that the June 2000 Release allegedly had settled
a dispute between CoBon and A&A under the Consulting Agreement. (Tab A (Findings ffi|35, 7, 8, Concl. Ijl, 2).) Specifically, the trial court found that the June 2000 Release had
settled an April-May 1998 dispute between A&A and CoBon, "memorialized" in the May
8, 1998 letter that Viron had attached to its complaint against Robena in the Pennsylvania
action. This letter addressed the issue of whether the services Viron proposed to provide to
Robena to assist in its operations were separate from A&A's consulting services to help

develop plants under the Consulting Agreement. There was no claim by anyone at that time
that Cobon's obligation to pay A&A under the Consulting Agreement was in any way in
dispute. (MatFactsffi[3-4.)
The trial court ruled, without analysis of the release language, that the June 2000
Release's language was "plain and unambiguous," the "plain result" of which was that A&A
had "accepted the compensation described [$60,000] in exchange for disputed claims under
the Consulting Agreement." (Tab A (Findings ^|9, Concl. ^3 (emphasis added)).) The trial
court merely cited the June 2000 Release's scope-setting language, without analysis. (Id. at
Concl. ^[3.) Instead of determining whether A&A's Claims were covered by that language,
the trial court concluded that "[t]here is no basis to limit the plain scope of the Release" so
as to exclude A&A's Claims under the Consulting Agreement. (Id. (emphasis added).)
Having determined that the June 2000 Release applied to A&A's Claims, the trial court
in the March 1, 2010 Order mechanically adopted several rulings proposed by CoBon that
attempted to justify that application. The trial court found that CoBon had paid Viron the
$ 15,000 monthly fee (Tab A (Findings Tf6)), even though it was undisputed that Robena was
unaffiliated with CoBon after June 26,1998 and Robena had paid those fees. The trial court
also found that Viron had entered into the June 2000 Release "with" CoBon and its affiliates
and insiders (id. at Facts f 8), even though that contract stated it was between only Viron and
Robena. The trial court did not determine to what services the contract language "any
consulting services which have been performed by Viron regarding the Robena Synthetic
Fuel Plant" referred. Instead, it ruled that all of A&A's services regarding any and all

synfuel plants were all related to each other and to A&A's services under the Consulting
Agreement (id. at Concl. ^|5), even though A&A had separate contracts with CoBon and
Robena to provide separate and different services. The trial court found that there was no
material difference between the May 8, 1998 letter and the July 1, 1998 agreement (id. at
Findings f 5), even though the former purportedly was a contract between A&A and CoBon
and the latter was a contract between Viron and Robena.
CoBon's evidence in support of its motions for summary judgment (discussed in
Section III of the Argument) did not show, much less show as a matter of undisputed fact,
that the June 2000 Release had settled any dispute under the Consulting Agreement. A&A,
in opposition, offered evidence that demonstrated the following:
(1) CoBon's ApriJ-May J 998 dispute with A&A concerned only whether Viron was
entitled to a contract with Robena, separate from the Consulting Agreement, for their newly
proposed services to Robena. This dispute was resolved when Robena separately retained
Viron: The April-May 1998 dispute arose in response to Viron's March 27, 1998 proposal
to Robena to provide plant operation services after the plant's construction. (Tabs F, AA at
ffl[ 103-114.) Viron proposed a contract with Robena for these services, separate from the
Consulting Agreement, because they deemed such services to be outside the scope of the
development and sale of the Robena synfuel plant that had occurred under the Consulting
Agreement. (Tabs F, AA at ^[104-106.) Viron made their proposal after Providian had
financed the Robena plant and was under contract to purchase the plant. (Id) The Robena
plant had been developed and placed under contract for sale, with A&A's substantial

assistance, with a long-term feedstock source in place. (Tab AA at ^[104-106.) Section 1.2
of the Consulting Agreement had expressly excluded the "direct management" of any
operating synfuel plant from A&A's scope of services to CoBon. (Tab C.)
In an April 10,1998 letter, CoBon, on behalf of Robena, questioned Viron's proposal,
and took the position that Viron's proposed services to Robena fell within the scope of
A&A's services to CoBon under the Consulting Agreement. (6548 at Ex. 413 (Tab G).)
After an April 15, 1998 meeting and a follow-up proposal by Viron, CoBon sent A&A the
May 8, 1998 letter relied upon by the trial court. (6548 at Ex. 419; Tab AA atffl[109-l10.)
In the May 8,1998 letter, which was proposed between only CoBon and A&A, CoBon
agreed that Robena would separately retain Viron for a $15,000 monthly fee. (6548 at Ex.
429 (Tab H); Tab AA at % 111.) However, in that letter, CoBon stated it was "frustrated" that
obtaining start-up coalfineshad become an issue and that A&A were threatening the entire
Robena project by allegedly withholding services to obtain start-up coalfinesfor the plant.
(Tab H.) CoBon stated that it was agreeing that Robena would retain Viron only as a result
of the "economic hardship" allegedly created by A&A and without "waiving any of its rights
under CoBon's November 1, 1996 Consulting Agreement with AGTC and Alpine." (Id.)
A&A signed the May 8,1998 letter but, at the same time, in May 12,1998 letters, A&A
each separately objected to CoBon's language in the May 8, 1998 letter. (Tab S at Ex. A;
6548 at Exs. 430 (Tab I), 431 (Tab J); Tab AA at \\ 12.) A&A each explained that obtaining
start-up coalfineswas not an issue and that they could not be jeopardizing the development
of the Robena plant as asserted by CoBon because they already were proceeding to obtain
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the small amount of feedstock needed to start the plant. (Tabs I5 J.) A&A explained that
their proposal as Viron to Robena was not to obtain start-up coal fines, but to obtain the
short-term feedstock needed for the operation of the Robena plant after its start-up and until
the wash facility was completed. (Id.)
In response, CoBon sent a May 18, 1998 proposed letter of understanding, which was
between only CoBon and A&A and which A&A executed on May 19, 1998. (Tabs K, AA
at ij 113.) The May 18-19, 1998 agreement provided that Robena would separately retain
Viron for a $ 15,000 monthly fee. (Id.) The May 18-19,1998 agreement did not contain the
dispute language set forth in CoBon's May 8, 1998 letter to which A&A had objected, but
it did include a reservation of rights by CoBon (discussed below). (Id.) As discussed below,
CoBon later represented to Palmer that the May 18-19, 1998 letter, not the May 8, 1998
lettei, had been the operative agreement between CoBon and A&A leading to Robena's
retention of Viron, (Tab U at p.4.)
At no time in March through July 1, 1998 did A&A demand payment from CoBon
under the Consulting Agreement. (Tabs F, I, J.) More importantly, CoBon did not repudiate
its duty to pay A&A under the Consulting Agreement if and when it began receiving
distributable proceeds. Indeed, there was not even a suggestion that the new agreement for
$15,000 per month to assist in the operation of the Robena plant could in any way affect
CoBon's duty to pay under the Consulting Agreement. (Tabs G, H, K.) The trial court found
that the April-May 1998 dispute had concerned only whether Viron were entitled to a
contract with Robena, separate from the Consulting Agreement. (Tab A (Findings ft 3 " 4 )-)

As called for by the May 18-19, 1998 letter of understanding, Robena separately
retained Viron with the July 1, 1998 agreement. (Tabs D, AA at 1(114.) CoBon later
represented to Palmer that the April-May 1998 dispute had been "negotiations" leading to
the July 1,1998 agreement, that the July 1,1998 agreement was the operative contract under
which Viron provided services to Robena, and that the July 1, 1998 agreement had
"superceded" the May 18-19, 1998 letter of understanding. (Tab U at p.4.) CoBon
represented that Viron's services to Robena were "operation" services. (Tab 0 at p.l.)
(2) CoBon only reserved its position that Viron was not entitled to a contract with
Robena for their services to Robena. CoBon never exercised its reservation of rights: The
May 18-19, 1998 letter of understanding, like the May 8, 1998 letter, provided that CoBon
"reserves its rights under CoBon's November 1, 1996 Consulting Agreement with AGTC,
Inc. and Alpine Coal Co., Inc. regarding the scope of consulting services to be provided
thereunder relative to the Project." (Tab K.) However, CoBon did not reserve any rights
regarding its duty to pay A&A under the Consulting Agreement if and when CoBon began
receiving distributable proceeds, because no issue had been raised in April-May 1998
regarding that duty. (Tabs F, G, H, I, J, K.) The trial court found that CoBon had only
reserved its position that Viron was not entitled to a contract with Robena, separate from the
Consulting Agreement (that is, CoBon had reserved the right to treat Robena's payments as
advances under the Consulting Agreement). (Tab A (Findings ^[4).)
However, after May 1998, CoBon never disputed Viron's entitlement to the July 1,
1998 agreement or Robena's liability to Viron for the $15,000 monthly fee under that

agreement (TabAAatffi|113,129,135.) CoBon never once took or directed Robena to take
the position that Viron was not entitled to be paid under the July 1, 1998 agreement. (Id)
Instead, CoBon acted contrary to the position it took in April-May 1998. After Robena
stopped paying Viron in May 1999, CoBon, as the general partner, always took the position
that Robena should pay Viron. Indeed, CoBon repeatedly attempted to get Viron paid. (6548
at Exs. 654, 696, 703, 731; Tabs M, N, O, T, S, U, V.) CoBon, as the general partner, took
the position that Viron had successfully performed under the July 1,1998 agreement and had
provided valuable services to Robena. (Id.) CoBon wrote to Palmer that Viron's Septembei
1, 1999 termination of services would have "devastating impact" on the success of4 the
Robena plant, was "unacceptable" and a '•crisis,'" and demanded that Robena immediately
pay Viron for upast services which have clearly been performed." (Tab Q.) CoBon
represented to Palmer that the subject of Viron's Pennsylvania action against Robena was
those parties' July 1, 1998 agreement and that Robena owed Viron. (Tabs U at p.4, V.)
(3) Robena was not an affiliate of CoBon after June 26. 1998, including when it
retained Viron on July L 1998 and had its fee dispute with Viron: There is no dispute that
Robena ceased to be an affiliate of CoBon on June 26, 1998, when CoBon sold Robena to
Providian; CoBon's counsel conceded this fact. (6457-6456.) After July 1,1999, CoBon did
not even manage Robena. (6548 at Ex. 736; Tab AA at ^[123.)
(4) Viron's Pennsylvania action involved only their fee dispute with Robena under the
July L 1998 agreement, and not any dispute with CoBon: Robena, not CoBon, paid Viron
the monthly $15,000 fee. (Tabs S at Ex.B, U at p.5.) The only contract obligating Robena

to pay Viron was the July 1,1998 agreement. (Tab D.) After Providian directed Robena to
stop paying its outside vendors in May 1999, Viron looked only to Robena for payment.
(6548 at Ex. 763; Tabs R; AA atffi[126-127.)Viron provided its September 1,1999 notice
of termination of services to Robena, not CoBon. (Tab P.)
After terminating their services and before filing the Pennsylvania action, Viron
negotiated for payment of the past owed $60,000 with Robena's representative, Palmer, not
CoBon. (Tab AA at 1[129.) After those negotiations failed, Viron made a formal demand for
payment of the $60,000 which was for four months of unpaid services to Robena, not CoBon.
(Tab R.) Viron filed the Pennsylvania action after Viron's November 10, 1999 formal
demand to Robena for payment of the $60,000 was not met. (Tabs R, S.)
Viron's Pennsylvania action was against only Robena. (Tab S.) Viron claimed only
breach of contract and sought recovery from Robena of $60,000, which was the exact amount
in dispute between Robena and Viron under the July 1, 1998 agreement. (Tab S atffl[3,7.)
CoBon represented to Palmer that the July 1, 1998 agreement, not the Consulting
Agreement nor the May 8,1998 letter, was the subject of the Pennsylvania action. Robena's
outside counsel asked CoBon what Viron's contractual relationship with Robena was. (6548
at Ex. 832.) In March 2000, CoBon responded as follows:
Robena's contractual arrangement with Viron consisted of [the May 18-19,1998
letter of understanding] between [CoBon] (the pre-closing project developer) and
Viron. This Letter of Understanding was superceded immediately after the project
closing by a Consulting Agreement letter dated 7/1/98 between Robena and
Viron.
(Tab U at p.4 (emphasis added).)

CoBon was not a party to Viron's dispute with Robena nor to Viron's Pennsylvania
action. Indeed, CoBon emphasized this to Palmer. When CoBon responded to Robena's
counsel's questions and requests lor information needed to defend the Pennsylvania action,
it directed its response to Palmer, not Robena's counsel, stating it was doing so because
Palmer was managing the Pennsylvania action and CoBon had "no relationship" with that
counsel (Tab U at p.l, 6548 at Ex. 849.) CoBon never appeared in Viron's Pennsylvania
aclion nor asserted any claims r^hts or defenses in it. (lab AA at 1^112, H5.) CoBon's
only involvement was as the general partner of Robena, LLP. (Tabs B, P, R.)
A&A had no dispute with CoBon nor e\en a suggestion of a dispute under the
Consulting Agreement, while Viron's and Robena's fee dispute and the resulting
Pennsylvania action were pending, (lab AA at ^li 129, 135,144.) A&A had not demanded
aivy payments from CoBon, and CoBon had not repudiated its duty pay A&A under the
Consulting Agreement. (fab AA at V 44.) l b the contrary, CoBon had just paid advances
to A&A based upon its anticipated receipt of distributable proceeds. (Tabs W, X.)
(5) The June 2000 Re lease was between only Viron and Robena, and its identified
subject was only the fee dispute beiween Viron and Robena: The June 2000 Release did not
state it was between A&A and CoBon. (Tab B.) The June 2000 Release did not identify its
subject was a dispute between CoBon and A&A. (Id.) Instead, the June 2000 Release stated
as follows at its outset:
THIS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELEASE is made by and
between Viron Energy, a Pennsylvania general partnership and Robena, LLC,
a Delaware limited liability company.

WHEREAS, certain claims, counterclaims and disputes have arisen between
Viron Energy ('Viron') and Robena, LLC ('Robena') (collectively, the
'Parties') including, without limitation, [the Pennsylvania action];
WHEREAS, the Parties now desire to settle the claims, counterclaims and
disputes between and among them;
(Id. (emphasis added).) Viron negotiated only with Robena's representative, Palmer, and not
CoBon, to settle the Pennsylvania action, including negotiating the June 2000 Release. (Tab
AA atffi[135,142-143; Tab U at p.8.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The disposal of A&A's Claims and their ancillary claims under the June 2000 Release
should be reversed for three independent reasons.
First, the trial court improperly applied the June 2000 Release to claims that did not
exist at the time that release was executed. Releases are to be strictly construed against
coverage of unaccrued claims. The June 2000 Release did not state that it covered potential
future claims and therefore did not cover A&A's Claims as a matter of law.
Second, the trial court applied the June 2000 Release to claims that Viron and Robena
did not intend to release, regardless of when A&A's Claims accrued. Viron and Robena
expressly provided that the intended scope of the release was "any and all claims ... which
relate to or arise out of any consulting services which have been performed by Viron
regarding the Robena Synthetic Fuel Plant." The only services Viron performed for Robena
were their services under the July 1,1998 agreement. The only services A&A performed as
"Viron" were their services to Robena. The only services Viron performed for only the
operating "Robena Synthetic Fuel Plant" were their services under the July 1, 1998

agreement. Viron and Robena also expressly provided that each of them was releasing the
same scope of claims. The inclusion of A&A's Claims against CoBon would make the
settlement and release unequal in scope since Robena was not a party to the Consulting
Agreement. Viron and Robena, in the June 2000 Release, also expressly provided that the
release's subject was a dispute between them, which meant its subject was limited to their
dispute under their only pre-release contract, the July 1, 1998 agreement. Viron were paid
$60,000 for their release, the exact amount at issue in their dispute with Robena under the
July 1, 1998 agreement.
Third, the trial court improperly determined the scope of the intended release without
analysis of the release's language The trial court's asserted basis for applying the release
to A&A's Claims was legally insufficient The trial court applied the June 2000 Release to
A&A's Claims by finding as undisputed fact that the June 2000 Release had settled the AprilMay 1998 dispute between CoBon and A&A. However, that dispute did not concern the
duty that was the subject of A&A's Claims, which was CoBon's duty to pay A&A under the
Consulting Agreement. Moreover, CoBon's summary judgment evidence was insufficient
to establish as a matter of undisputed fact that the June 2000 Release had settled any dispute
under the Consulting Agreement.
ARGUMENT
I.

The March 1,2010 Order Should Be Reversed Because The June 2000 Release Did
Not Intend The Release Of Claims, Such As A&A's Claims, That Did Not Exist
When That Release Was Executed
"[R]eleases are strictly construed so as not to bar the enforcement of a claim which

had not yet accrued at the date of the execution of the release." Vaughn v. Didizian. 648
A.2d 38, 40 fPa. Super. Ct. 1994) (emphasis added).7 Moreover, a release may only cover
"such matters as can fairly be said to have been within the contemplation of the parties when
the release was given." Id; see also Restifo v. McDonald. 230 A.2d 199, 201 (Pa. 1967)
("[T]he general words of the release will not be construed so as to bar the enforcement of a
claim which has not accrued at the date of the release."). As such, if there is no mention of
^potential future claims in a release, it does not bar any future claim. Id_ However, even if
there is a mention of potential future claims, a release does not bar a particular future claim
that was not within the contemplation of the parties at the time of the release. Id.
There was no mention of potential future claims in the June 2000 Release. It did not
state it covered "future" claims or claims that Viron "may hereafter" have, or use language
that every competent lawyer knows refers to and includes potential future claims. Cf.
Vaughn. 648 A.2d at 39. To the contrary, the June 2000 Release expressly mentioned only
existing claims. (Tab B at §1.)
As such, and properly construed, the June 2000 Release did not cover A&A's Claims,
or A&A's ancillary claims, which did not even exist when the June 2000 Release was
executed. By CoBon' s own account, CoBon' s duty to pay consulting fees to A&A under the
Consulting Agreement was entirely executory when the June 2000 Release was signed
because CoBon had yet to receive any proceeds for tax credits. In CoBon's first (and only)
accounting to A&A, CoBon reported it started receiving proceeds "for distribution" to A&A
7

Bat §8.)

The June 2000 Release provided that Pennsylvania law is its controlling law. (Tab

in August 2001, over a year after the June 2000 Release was executed. (Tab Y.) Almost a
year and a half after the June 2000 Release was executed, CoBon started paying A&A under
the Consulting Agreement in November and December 2001. (Id.) A&A's Claims under
the Consulting Agreement did not accrue and would not have accrued until November 2002,
when CoBon first repudiated its duty to pay. See, e.g., Total Control Inc. v. Danaher Corp..
359 F. Supp2d 387. 393-94 (ED. Pa. 2005) (observing rule regarding accrual of claim upon
repudiation). A&A's fraudulent transfer claims did not accrue, at the earliest, until after
CoBon began receiving proceeds chat insiders of CoBon transfer!ed to them. See U.C.A. §
25-6-10. A&A's alter ego claim was only a basis for liability on a judgment that has not yet
been obtained.
Even were there any further issue, a release of A&A's Claims clearl> was not within
the contemplation of Viron at the time they gave the release. Viron could not have
contemplated releasing A&A's Claims at that time because, immediately before the June
2000 Release was executed, CoBon paid A&A advances on the consulting fee under the
Consulting Agreement based upon CoBon's anticipated receipt of proceeds for tax credits
from the PBS and Pace synfuel facilities, (labs W, X ) When Viron gave the Robena
release, A&A had no dispute with CoBon concerning payments under the Consulting
Agreement, nor any reason to think there could be some future dispute. (Facts, supra, at 17,
22, 24-26.) A&A clearly anticipated getting paid by CoBon and thus did not contemplate
releasing CoBon in June 2000.
The trial court's application of the June 2000 Release is contrary to Pennsylvania case

law. In Vaughn, the court held it would be "absurd" to apply a release between a passenger
and the driver relating to a car accident to bar the passenger's claim for medical malpractice
against a doctor, where the medical malpractice claim arose from treatments occurring seven
months after the release had been executed. 648 A.2d at 40-41. This was despite the fact that
the subject release had mentioned it covered potential future claims. M The trial court's
application of the June 2000 Release to A&A's Claims is even more "absurd," considering
the June 2000 Release did not even mention potential future claims.
II.

The March 1, 2010 Order Should Be Reversed Because Viron And Robena Did
Not Intend, With The June 2000 Release, To Release Any Claims To Payment
Under The Consulting Agreement
Release agreements are to be construed in accordance with the basic principles of

contract law. Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Schneider. 906 A.2d 586. 595 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006).
In construing a release, the intention of the parties is "paramount." M A release should be
interpreted iwin a manner which ascribes the most reasonable, probable and natural conduct
of the parties, bearing in mind the objects manifestly to be accomplished." M To determine
the parties' intention, a court must first look to the language of the release, and then inquire
into the circumstances surrounding the execution of the release in order to determine the
parties' purpose and what was within their contemplation. See Bickings v. Bethlehem Lukens
Plate. 82 F. Supp.2d 402. 405-06 (ED. Pa. 2000) (applying Pennsylvania law).
Robena and Viron, the parties who executed the June 2000 Release, did not intend a
settlement and release of any claims by A&A for payment under the Consulting Agreement,
because they did not state in the June 2000 Release that A&A were settling and releasing any

claims under the Consulting Agreement. Four fundamental aspects of the language used in
June 2000 Release demonstrate that Robena and Viron intended only a settlement and release
of claims under their July 1, 1998 agreement.
First, the language setting the scope of the intended settlement and release stated that
Viron and Robena released each other only from "any and all claims . . . which relate to
or arise out of any consulting services which have been performed by Viron regarding
the Robena Synthetic Fuel Plant.,.." (Tab B at §1 (emphasis added).) The only claims
identified by this language were claims relating to Viron's services to Robena under the July
1, 1998 agreement. This language can only refer to Viron's services to Robena as it was
Viron and Robena who were mutually releasing claims. Viron's only services to Robena
were under the July 1, 1998 agreement. (Facts, supra, at 10-16. 20-23.) This language
mentioned only services performed by "Viron" and services performed regarding only "the
Robena Synthetic Fuel Plant." The only services that A&A perfonned as "Viron" were their
services to Robena. (Id.) The only services Viron performed regarding the "Robena
Synthetic Fuel Plant," which had been operating for two years by the time the June 2000
Release was executed, were their services under the July 1, 1998 agreement. (Id.)
This scope-setting language did not refer to A&A's services to CoBon and cannot be
interpreted to refer to such services. A&A provided consulting services to CoBon under the
separate Consulting Agreement. A&A had not been referred to as "Viron" in connection
with those separate services and those separate services had regarded the identification,
location, and development of multiple potential synfuel plants. (Facts, supra at 7-10.) The

only consulting services A&A had provided to the operating Robena plant, and the only
services they had provided as "Viron," were their services to Robena under the July 1,1998
agreement to assist in the operation of one plant that had already been developed. (Facts,
supra, at 10-16.) It certainly had nothing to do with the other five plants that had been
developed under the Consulting Agreement.
The trial court attempted to avoid the fact that this scope-setting language mentioned
only services regarding the by then operating Robena plant by ruling that all of A&A's
•services regarding each synfiiel plant project were related to each other, including all services
to the Robena plant. (Tab A (Concl. 15).) This ruling was a backwards justification for the
trial court's conclusion that the June 2000 Release applied to A&A's Claims. Rather than
properly first determine to what services this release language referred and then determine
whether A&A's Claims related to the referenced services, the trial court improperly tried to
fit A&A's Claims into the scope of the release by deciding what services related to any
services regarding the Robena plant.
According to this ruling, the June 2000 Release covered A&A's Claims because those
claims related to services that related to Viron's services to the operating Robena plant.
However, contrary to this analysis, by expressly limiting the scope of the intended release to
claims "which relate to or arise out o f Viron's services to the operating Robena synfiiel
plant, Viron and Robena could not have intended, as a matter of law, to also release claims
that related to services A&A performed under the Consulting Agreement with CoBon
concerning the PBS plant or the four Pace plants that are in different locations with different

owners from the Robena plant. Nor did they release claims that related to A&A's consulting
services that culminated in the development and sale of the Robena plant under the
Consulting Agreement. As a matter of law, the phrase "which relate to or arise out o f in the
June 2000 Release merely served to qualify the claims to which the phrase refers, rather than
expand the subject matter to which a covered claim must relate. See Central States
Foundation v. Balka. 590 N.W.2d 832. 837 (Neb, 1999). The trial court's ruling ignored
that, as CoBon represented to Palmer (Tab U at p.4), Viron's services to Robena regarding
the operating Robena plant had been provided under the July 1, 1998 agreement, not the
Consulting Agreement,
Second, the June 2000 Release stated that Viron and Robena each were settling and
releasing the same scope of claims. The June 2000 Release stated "The Parties [Viron and
Robena] do hereby release and forever discharge each other .. /' from the released claims.
(Tab B at §1.) This meant the intended release covered only claims regarding Viron's
services to Robena under the July 1, 1998 agreement because only that contract could have
given rise to a release of equal scope between Viron and Robena. Claims under the
Consulting Agreement could not be included because the Consulting Agreement was not a
basis of a settlement and release of equal scope between Viron and Robena (since Robena
was not a party to the Consulting Agreement). If the release were applied, as it was by the
trial court, to also include a unilateral settlement and release of substantial claims by A&A
under the Consulting Agreement, the settlement and release would be improperly rendered
unequal in scope, contrary to the language of the June 2000 Release.

Third, the June 2000 Release stated that the only dispute being settled was a dispute
between Viron and Robena. The recitals in the June 2000 Release stated "WHEREAS,
certain claims, counterclaims and disputes have arisen between Viron Energy ('Viron') and
Robena, LLC ('Robena') (collectively, the 'Parties')... [and] the Parties now desire to settle
the claims, counterclaims and disputes between and among them." (Tab B (emphasis
added).) The June 2000 Release did not refer to any dispute between A&A and GoBon.
; Plainly, Robena's and Viron's purpose was a settlement of only a dispute between
themselves over four months of unpaid fees under the July 1,1998 agreement. Viron's and
Robena's dispute could not have involved the Consulting Agreement because Robena was
not a party to that contract. (Tab C.)
Fourth, the June 2000 Release provided that the only consideration to Viron for their
release of claims was the exact amount, $60,000, that was at issue in their dispute with
Robena. (Tab B; Tab S at f 7, Prayer.) This demonstrates that the only dispute settled by
the June 2000 Release was Viron's and Robena's fee dispute under the July 1, 1998
agreement. This also establishes the lack of required consideration to Viron for their release
of any claims other than their claim to payment under the July 1,1998 agreement. See Fedun
v. Mike's Cafe, Inc.. 204 A.2d 776.781 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1964^ (holding that a release was not
valid because of a lack of consideration for the release); Estate Landscape & Snow Removal
Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel Co.. 844 P.2d 322.328 (Utah 1992^1 (payment
of one obligation is not consideration for discharge of a different obligation). Viron received
no consideration for the release of A&A's Claims that were then potentially worth millions

of dollars.
The circumstances of the June 2000 Release confirm that it was not within Viron's and
Robena's contemplation to release any claims other than claims under the July 15 1998
agreement. The June 2000 Release settled Viron's Pennsylvania action against only Robena.
(Tab B.) Robena was not an affiliate of CoBon and was not a party to the Consulting
Agreement. (Facts, supra, at 11, 24.) Instead, Robena had its own contract for Viron's
services, the July L 1998 agreement, which was separate from the Consulting Agreement.
(Id. at 10-16.) Viron sued Robena for breach of that contract, which was iheir only claim,
as the July 1,1998 agreement was the only contract between Viron and Robena. (Id.) Viron
sought to recover $60,000 for four months of service to Robena, which was the exact amount
Robena owed under the July 1, 1998 agreement. (Id) CoBon represented that the subject
of the Pennsylvania action was the July 1, 1998 agreement. (Tab U at p 4.) .Viron sued
Robena to resolve only their fee dispute with Robena over the $60,000. (Facts, supra, at 14,
24-26.) A&A had no dispute with CoBon at the time Viron's lawsuit against Robena was
filed or pending. (Id) CoBon made no appearance in the Pennsylvania action and had "no
relationship" with Robena's counsel in that action. (Id.) Instead, only Palmer, who had no
authority regarding the Consulting Agreement, managed the action for Robena. (Id.)
Contrary to the March 1, 2010 Order, Robena's and Viron's identification of CoBon
and its insiders and affiliates as "Released Parties" did not demonstrate their intent to settle
and release claims under the Consulting Agreement. This identification of "Release Parties"
was consistent with the Pennsylvania rule of law that releases may apply to persons who are

not parties to a release. See Crestar Mortz. Corp. v. Shapiro. 937 F.Supp. 453,456 fE.D.Pa.
1996) (explaining Pennsylvania law). However, by the release's own language, "Released
Parties" served only to define who was released, not which claims were released. Which
claims were released is a separate and distinct issue from who was released, and is
determined from the scope-setting language set forth above. See id. at 457-459 (undertaking
separate analysis of those issues). Moreover, as potential intended beneficiaries of the
release, the "Release Parties" could only enforce the scope of release that was expressly
provided for in the June 2000 Release, and not any greater scope of release. See Restatement
(Second) of Contracts §§ 304, 309, cmt. b ("[T]he right of the beneficiary is subject to any
limitations imposed by the terms of the contract.").
The identification of "Released Parties" confirms that Viron's and Robena's intent was
to settle and release only claims regarding Viron's services to Robena under their July 1,
1998 agreement. While all of the identified "Released Parties" were potential defendants on
Viron's and Robena's claims relating to Viron's services under the July 1,1998 agreement,
not all of them, such as Palmer and its insiders, were potential defendants on claims under
the Consulting Agreement. Moreover, under CoBon's theory, the June 2000 Release also
could be mistakenly applied to, for example, a claim by Robena against Palmer for
mismanagement under Robena's July 1,1999 management agreement with Palmer because
Palmer also was a "Released Party."
Even were there a facial ambiguity regarding the intended scope of the release, extrinsic
evidence regarding Viron's and Robena's intentions demonstrates that the ambiguity would

be resolved against the trial court's application of the release.8 A&A offered evidence that
they, as Viron, intended only a release of their claim to payment under the July 1, 1998
agreement. (Tab AA at f 143.) A&A could not had intended a release of any claim to
payment under the Consulting Agreement. As far as A&A knew at the time they gave the
release as Viron, CoBon was going to pay them under the Consulting Agreement.
CoBon had just previously, in May 2000, paid A&A advances based upon its anticipated
receipt of proceeds for tax credits. (Tabs W, X, AA at 1144.) A&A also offered evidence
that Palmer, with whom Viron exclusively negotiated the June 2000 Release, communicated
to them an intent to release only claims relating Viron's services to Robena. (Tab AA at
1fl44.) CoBon offered no evidence contradicting this evidence as to Viron's and Robena's
intent. As such, this evidence would be controlling were there an ambiguity.
Moreover, even incorrectly assuming that CoBon's intentions were relevant, CoBon
demonstrated no intent that the June 2000 Release was a settlement and release by A&A of
any claim to payment under the Consulting Agreement. To the contrary, in November
2001, after the June 2000 Release was executed, CoBon commenced paying A&A under
the Consulting Agreement. (Tab Y.) CoBon's July 2002 accounting acknowledged its
payments to A&A under the Consulting Agreement and A&A's "entitlement" to
distributions, and made no mention of the June 2000 Release. (Id.) Moreover, CoBon did
not rely upon or even mention the June 2000 Release when itfirstrepudiated its duty to pay
8

There is no facial ambiguity because CoBon's interpretation is not reasonable under
the release's language. A release is ambiguous only if it is reasonably susceptible to more
than one interpretation. Sun Co., Inc. (R&M) v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n. 708 A.2d
875, 878 (Pa. Commonweal. 1998).

A&A under the Consulting Agreement in November 2002. (Tab Z.) CoBon did not even
rely upon the June 2000 Release in its original pleadings below.
III. The March 1, 2010 Order Should Be Reversed, Even Were There An Indication
In The Release Of An Intent To Release Potential Future Claims Under The
Consulting Agreement, Because There Was No Evidence Demonstrating It Was
Within Viron's Contemplation To Release Any Such Claims
The trial court applied the June 2000 Release to A&A's Claims without any analysis
of the release language. Instead, the trial court's application of the June 2000 Release to
A&A's Claims rested at bottom upon its finding, from extrinsic evidence, that the June 2000
Release had settled the April-May 1998 dispute between CoBon and A&A. (Tab A
(Findings Iff3-8).) This was error under Pennsylvania law for two related reasons.
First, the trial court was required to start its analysis with the release's language. See
Bickims. 82 F. Supp.2d at 405. Second, the trial court could not rely upon the circumstances
of the release, as it did, to find an intent not indicated by the release's language. See id;
Vaughn. 648 A.2d at 40; Restifo. 230 A.2d at 201. The circumstances of a release are
relevant only for determining whether a particular claim was not within the contemplation
of the release's parties, rather than for adding claims not covered by the release's language.
See Bickings. 82 F. Supp.2d at 405; Vaughn. 648 A.2d at 40: Restifo. 230 A.2dat201. For
example, if a release mentions potential future claims, the circumstances determine whether
a particular future claim was within the contemplation of the parties so as to be barred.
Vaughn. 648 A.2d at 40; Restifo. 230 A.2d at 201. However, the circumstances cannot be
used to demonstrate that a particular future claim was released and is barred if the language
does not mention potential future claims. See Bickings. 82 F. Supp.2d at 405; Vaughn. 648

A.2d at 40; Restifo. 230 A.2d at 201.
There was no indication in the June 2000 Release's language that it covered potential
future claims or claims under the Consulting Agreement, as discussed in the previous two
sections. As such, contrary to the trial court's analysis, the circumstances of the release could
not be used to determine it barred A&A's Claims under the Consulting Agreement.
Moreover, even incorrectly assuming there were any such indication, the trial court's
finding that the June 2000 Release settled CoBoif s and A&A's April-May 1998 dispute was
not legally sufficient to demonstrate it was within Viron's contemplation to release any
claims to payment under the Consulting Agreement, such as A&A's Claims. This is because
A&A's Claims did not fall within the scope of that April-May 1998 dispute.
The April-May 1998 dispute did not concern CoBon's duty to pay under the Consulting
Agreement that was Ihe subject of A&A's Claims. In April-May 1998, CoBon's duty to pay
A&A consulting fees under the Consulting Agreement, which depended upon its receipt of
proceeds for tax credits, was purely executory. (Facts, supra, at 9, 17-18.) At that time,
A&A made no demand for payment under the Consulting Agreement and CoBon did not
repudiate its duty to pay A&A under that contract. {Id. at 17-18, 20-23.) Instead, CoBon
began paying A&A under the Consulting Agreement in November 2001, well after AprilMay 1998. (Tab Y.) Nor did the April-May 1998 dispute concern the potential ancillary
liability of CoBon's affiliates and insiders for fraudulent transfers of proceeds that had not
yet been received or their alter ego liability for a judgment yet to come.
The April-May 1998 dispute concerned only whether Viron were entitled to a contract

with Robena, separate from the Consulting Agreement, for their proposed services to
Robena. (Facts, supra, at 20-23.) The trial court expressly found this was the scope of
the April-May 1998 dispute. (Tab A (Findings 1ffi3-4).) As such, even if the April-May
1998 dispute had lingered for two years and been settled by the June 2000 Release, all that
would have been settled was CoBon's right to offset Robena's payments to Viron from
amounts that CoBon otherwise prospectively might owe A&A under the Consulting
Agreementif and when it received distributable proceeds. Indeed, the trial court found that
CoBon onl> reserved "rights to treat the payment [by Robena] as an advance or otherwise
not due under the Consulting Agreement." (Tab A (Findings f4 (emphasis added)).) This
was an acknowledgment that whether CoBon "otherwise" owed under the Consulting
Agreement was an entirely separate issue from that raised in April-May 1998. Thus, even
if the June 2000 Release had settled the April-May 1998 dispute and the intended scope of
the release could be determined from that alleged fact alone, there still would be no basis for
concluding that Viron contemplated the release of any claim regarding CoBon's duty to pay
A&A, and so the release still could not cover A&A's Claims.
Also, there was insufficient evidence to find, much less as undisputed fact, that the June
2000 Release had settled any dispute under the Consulting Agreement such that Viron could
have contemplated a release of any claim under that contract, much less specifically a dispute
concerning CoBon's duty to pay A&A if and when it received proceeds for developed plants.
This is demonstrated by a review of CoBon's evidence offered in support of its motions:
(1) Evidence regarding Robena's alleged affiliation with CoBon. (1203-1202; 1225-

1224.) CoBon argued that Robena was CoBon when it paid Viron and had its fee dispute
with Viron, and when that dispute was settled, because CoBon was the general partner and
0.01 percent owner of Robena, LLP, the company through which Providian owned Robena.
Plainly, CoBon lacked the degree of ownership of, or control over, Robena necessary to
make Robena an affiliate of CoBon. Cf, e.g., U.C.A. §25-6-2 (definition of "affiliate" under
fraudulent transfer law). CoBon ignored it lacked the ability to get Robena to pay Viron
from May 1999 onward. (Facts, supra at 13-15.) Indeed, CoBon complained of its lack of
authority over Robena. (Tab T at pp.3-4.) Robena was owned by Providian when Robena
paid Viron, when Robena had its fee dispute with Viron, and when that dispute was settled
with the June 2000 Release (Facts, supra, at 11.)
(2) Evidence regarding the existence of the April-May 1998 dispute, including the
May 8,1998 letter. (1081-1066; 1169-1164; 1206-1204; 1228-1225; 2188-2147; 2227-2224;
2837-2831; 2887-2861; 3065-3060; 3138-3136; 3455-3438; 3534-3533; 5459-5434; 54965493.) The mere existence of the April-May 1998 dispute did not establish, as required,
either that it concerned CoBon's duty to pay A&A under the Consulting Agreement, or that
it had lingered for two years and been settled by the June 2000 Release. In fact, the exclusive
subject of the May 8, 1998 letter and the parties' other correspondence at that time was
whether Viron were entitled to a contract with Robena, separate from the Consulting
Agreement, for their proposed services to Robena, thus showing that dispute was limited to
that subject. (Facts, supra, at 20-23.)
By showing that the dispute concerned only whether Viron was entitled to a separate

contract with Robena, CoBon's evidence established that the April-May 1998 dispute was
resolved when Robena separately retained Viron on July 1,1998. On that date, Viron got the
separate contract they had proposed and, after May 1998, CoBon never once disputed
Viron's entitlement to that contract or Robena's liability under that contract. Indeed, CoBon
viewed the dispute as "negotiations" of the July 1, 1998 agreement. (Tab U at p.4.)
(3) Evidence regarding the lack of any "retraction" of the May 8.1998 letter. (21752147; 2224,2219; 2859; 3137-3136; 5475-5434; 5493-5492.) CoBon relied upon this
"evidence" to argue that the May 8,1998 letter was the operative contract under which Viron
provided services to Robena, such that Viron's fee dispute with Robena allegedly had been
a dispute with CoBon. This ignored that Viron provided services to Robena and was paid
by Robena under the July 1, 1998 agreement. The July 1, 1998 agreement did not need to
retract anything; it was issued pursuant to, and had "superceded," the May 18-19,1998 letter
of understanding. (Tab U at p.4.)
Whether the May 8, 1998 letter or May 18-19, 1998 letter was the operative contract
between CoBon and A&A leading to Robena's retention of Viron is irrelevant. Both letters
were part of what CoBon characterized as "negotiations" of the July 1,1998 agreement and
both provided Robena would separately retain Viron. (Tab U at p.4.) Both letters establish
that the April-May 1998 dispute did not concern CoBon's duty to pay A&A under the
Consulting Agreement and that the April-May 1998 dispute did not linger past Robena's
retention of Viron. (Tabs H, K.)
Moreover, the lack of any words of retraction in the May 18-19, 1998 letter of

understanding is irrelevant because A&A objected to the May 8, 1998 letter, which caused
CoBon to send the May 18,1998 letter. (Facts, supra, at 21-22.) The May 18-19,1998 letter
of understanding served no purpose if it did not replace the May 8,1998 letter. CoBon itself
represented that the May 18-19,1998^ letter of understanding, not the May 8,1998 letter, had
been the operative contract between it and A&A. (Tab U at p.4.)
(4) CoBon;s reservation of rights in May 1998. (2224-2219; 2175-2147; Tab S at
Ex.A.) CoBon's reservation of rights did not turn Viron's fee dispute with Robena into a
dispute between A&A and CoBon under the Consulting Agreement. CoBon did not reserve
any position regarding its duty to pay A&A under the Consulting Agreement. CoBon
reserved only its position that Viron was not entitled to a contract with Robena, separate from
the Consulting Agreement, for services to Robena (that is, that Robena's payments could be
treated as advances under the Consulting Agreement). (Tab A (Findings \A).)
Moreover, CoBon's May 1998 reservation of rights had no bearing on the June 2000
Release because that release settled Viron's Pennsylvania action and CoBon was not a party
to, nor asserted any rights in, that action. (Facts, supra, at 24-26.) Also, CoBon could not
have asserted its April-May 1998 position as, after May 1998, CoBon always acknowledged
Viron's entitlement to payment and Robena's liability under the July 1, 1998 agreement.
(5) Viron's identification in their Pennsylvania complaint of the May 8. 1998 letter
as their contract with Robena, and Viron's references in reports and invoices to the May 1819. 1998 letter of understanding. (1162-1133; 1203; 3058-3029; 3136; 3436-3412; 3531;
5476-5326; 5492-5485.) Even if taken at their face value, Viron's identification of the May

8,1998 letter in their Pennsylvania complaint, and references to the May 18-19, 1998 letter
of understanding, do not establish that the June 2000 Release settled a dispute concerning
CoBon's duty to pay under the Consulting Agreement. Those letters only addressed a dispute
concerning whether Viron was entitled to a separate contract with Robena. (Tabs H, K.)
Moreover, Viron's identification in their Pennsylvania complaint of the May 8, 1998
letter as their contract with Robena did not turn that action into a dispute between A&A and
CoBon under the Consulting Agreement, much less a dispute concerning CoBon's duty to
pay under the Consulting Agreement. This would have been contrary to the facts. Viron
sued only Robena, which was unaffiliated with CoBon. (Facts, supra, at 11.) Robena was
not a party to the Consulting Agreement and, instead, had its own separate contract for
Viron's services, the July 1, 1998 agreement. (Tabs C, D.) Viron sued Robena for only
breach of a contract and the July 1,1998 agreement was the only contract between Viron and
Robena. (Tab S.) The May 8, 1998 letter did not even purport to be a contract between
Robena and Viron. (Tab H.) Viron sued to recover only $60,000 for four months of service
to Robena - the exact amount Robena owed under the July 1, 1998 agreement. (Tab S.)
Meanwhile, A&A had no dispute with CoBon leading to the Viron's lawsuit against Robena
or while that action was pending. (Facts, supra, at 17-18, 24-26.) Further, CoBon had "no
relationship" with Robena's counsel for the Pennsylvania action and, instead, Palmer (who
had no authority regarding the Consulting Agreement) managed the action for Robena. (Tab
U at p.l.) CoBon never even appeared in the Pennsylvania action. Plainly, if Viron's
Pennsylvania action had involved a dispute with CoBon, CoBon would have been a

defendant and would have had a relationship with defendant's counsel in that action.
These facts demonstrate that Viron, which filed the Pennsylvania action pro se? simply
identified the wrong document as their contract with Robena. Alpine's principal testified he
identified the wrong document. (Tab AA at f 132.) Robena's response to the Pennsylvania
complaint was an objection that Viron had identified the wrong document. (6548 at Ex.
831 A.) Indeed, CoBon acknowledged that Viron had identified the wrong document.
Robena \s counsel had to ask CoBon what Robena\ conti actual relalK mship with Viron w as.
(6548 at Ex. 832.) CoBon did not respond that the contract was eithei the May 8,1998 letter
or the Consulting Agreement. iTib U at p.4.) Instead, CoBon responded that the correel
contract wras the July 1, 1998 agreement:
Robena's contractual an angement with Viron consisted of [the Ma)718* 19, 1998
letter of understanding] between [CoBon] (the pre-closing project developer) and
Viron. This Letter of Understanding was superceded immediately after the
project closing by a Consulting Agreement letter dated 7/1/98 between
Robena and Viron.
(Tab U atp.4 (emphasis added).) As CoBon correctly acknowledged, the May 851998 letter
had not been even the relevant contract between it and A&A.
Viron's references to the May 18-19, 1998 letter in reports and invoices also fails to
demonstrate that the dispute underlying the June 2000 Release was anything other than
Viron's fee dispute with Robena. All of the references cited by CoBon regaided a contract
between Viron and Robena for services to Robena, yet the May 18-19,1998 letter had not
been a contract between Viron and Robena; their only contract was the July 1, 1998
agreement. The invoices were in the name of "Viron" and were submitted only to Robena.

(Tab S at Ex.B.) CoBon sold Robena to Providian after the first invoice, such that Robena
was no longer an affiliate of CoBon.9 Robena, not CoBon, paid the invoices. (Id.)
(6) A&A's acknowledgments that Viron was simply a name for A&A and references
to the "Robena Project". (2203-2201; 2187; 2181; 2105-2102; 3020-2889; 3139-3138;
3405.) CoBon argued from this "evidence" that Viron's services to Robena had been
services to CoBon under the Consulting Agreement, such that Viron's dispute with Robena
allegedly had been a dispute with CoBon. CoBon again ignored that Viron was separately
retained and paid by Robena under the July 1,1998 agreement. CoBon itself acknowledged
the distinction between the development services that A&A provided as "A&A" or "Alpine
Coal" and "AGTC," and the operations separate services that A&A provided as "Viron."
(Facts, supra, at 11.) CoBon referred to A&A as "Viron" only in connection with their
operations services to Robena under the July 1,1998 agreement; CoBon always referred to
A&A as "A&A" or as "Alpine" or "AGTC" in connection with their services to CoBon
under the Consulting Agreement, even after Viron started providing separate services to
Robena. (Id.) The July 1, 1998 agreement and the June 2000 Release, both with Robena,
are the only contracts that referred to A&A as "Viron."
A&A's references to the "Robena Project" in connection with both their services to
CoBon and their separate services as Viron to Robena did not change the fundamental fact
that Robena separately retained and paid Viron. The parties referred to both the project to
9

Viron's references to the May 18-19,1998 letter were a form carry-over from their
first invoice, which had pre-dated the July 1,1998 agreement (since the May 18-19 letter had
committed Robena to retain Viron and had provided that the fee was "retroactive" to May
1,1998). (Tab K; 5442-5441.)

develop the Robena plant and the operation of the Robena plant as "the Robena Project."
However, the June 2000 Release's scope-setting language referred to only the "Robena
Synthetic Fuel Plant," which had been in operation for two years at the time the June 2000
Release was executed, and defined that operating plant as the "Project." (Tab B.) That
release language did not refer to the "Robena Project" so as to indicate an intent to cover
A&A's separate development sendees to CoBon. (Tab B.)
(7) A&A^ principals' deposition testimony allegedly regardingjhe intended scope
of the June 2000 Release. (1124-1083; 1203-1200; 3135-3133.) CoBon represented to the
trial court that A&A's principals had testified that it was intended that the June 2000 Release
covered claims under the Consulting Agreement, but never cited any such testimony. Neither
ofA&A's principals ever testified to any such intent. (3391 atpp.lviii-hx.) CoBon's counsel
only once asked just one of A&A's principals about the intended scope of the June 2000
Release; that principal was asked if he understood the June 2000 Release had released claims
against CoBon. He responded unequivocally "No." (Id; 3392 at Ex.A.)
Similarly, CoBon relied upon A&A's principals' deposition testimony regarding the
logical relation between their development services to the six synfuel plants that were
developed to argue that A&A's Claims based upon those services were covered by the June
2000 Release. Yet, none of that testimony was given in response to questions regarding the
intended scope of that release. This testimony was irrelevant because whether A&A's
services to CoBon were all related to each other, or even to Viron's separate services to
Robena, is not the test for determining the scope of the intended release.

(8) CoBon's inclusion as a "Released Party" in the June 2000 Release and evidence
regarding CoBon's involvement in the June 2000 Release. (1131-1126; 1202; 2339-2310;
3027-3022; 3136-3135.) CoBon relied heavily upon the fact that it was a "Released Party"
to argue that it allegedly was a party to the release and that the release had settled a dispute
under the Consulting Agreement. This is refuted by the June 2000 Release's plain language:
THIS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELEASE is made by and
between Viron Energy, a Pennsylvania general partnership and Robena, LLC,
a Delaware limited liability company.
WHEREAS, certain claims, counterclaims and disputes have arisen between
Viron Energy ('Viron') and Robena, LLC ('Robena') (collectively, the
'Parties') including, without limitation, [the Pennsylvania action];
WHEREAS, the Parties now desire to settle the claims, counterclaims and
disputes beta een and among them;
(Tab B (emphasis added).) This contract language meant the June 2000 Release did not
settle a dispute under the Consulting Agreement. The identification of "Released Parties"
confirmed that the release had settled only Viron's and Robena's fee dispute since not all of
the "Release Parties" were potential defendants on claims under the Consulting Agreement.
CoBon's only involvement in the Pennsylvania action and its settlement was as the
general partner of Robena, LLP. CoBon emphasized to Palmer that it was not a party to
Robena's dispute with Viron nor the resulting Pennsylvania action: CoBon told Palmer that
Palmer was responsible for handling the Pennsylvania action and that CoBon had "no
relationship" with Robena's counsel for that action. (Tab U at p. 1.) Palmer would not have
exclusively managed the Pennsylvania action for Robena, and exclusively negotiated the
June 2000 Release with Viron, as it did, if the subject dispute had concerned CoBon's duty

to pay A&A under the Consulting Agreement Viron would not have negotiated exclusively
with Palmer, as they did, if they had been negotiating a settlement of claims to payment under
the Consulting Agreement. Palmer had no authority regarding a dispute between CoBon and
A&A under the Consulting Agreement.
Lastly, CoBon would not have commenced paying A&A under the Consulting
Agreement in November 2001, based upon the commencement of its receipt of proceeds for
tax credits, if the June 2000 Release had settled a dispute concerning CoBou's duty lo pay
A&A if and when it began receiving distributable proceeds. Nor would CoBon have paid
A&A advances it. [vfay 2000, immediately before the June 2000 Release was executed, based
upon CoBon's anticipated receipt of proceeds for tax credits.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons. A&A respectfully submit that the tiial court's giant of
summary judgment in favor of CoBon as to A&A's Claims and dismissal of A&A \s ancillary
claims, by the Match 1,2010 Order, should be reversed, the claims reinstated and the matter
be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings on all claims.
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